Trump boasts about the art of the deal. He knows nothing about the art of war

From the French Revolution through to early British parliamentary practice, and from prime ministers such as Winston Churchill to presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, the idea that great power demands great responsibility has been something spoken of by those entrusted with political power, even if they did not always practise it.

The ill-fated Israeli and American plan to topple Iran’s nearly half-century-old theocratic regime, however, ignored that ideal to the plan’s detriment. It has become the latest example of politicians overestimating the ability of their military to effect political change, and underestimating the ability of their opponents to resist it.

The most frustrating thing about Donald Trump’s support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to change the political map of the Middle East is that Iran’s response was entirely predictable. Completely overmatched in the air and on the sea and unlikely to have to face a significant land threat, Tehran long ago understood that its arsenal of rockets, missiles and drones gave it strategic reach and leverage. By targeting directly Israel and Gulf states that hosted US forces, while closing off the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran could hit back at its main antagonist and impose an economic cost on the regional and global economies that Washington wouldn’t be able to ignore.

And so it came to pass. Tehran conducted its campaign in exactly the way any analyst worth their salt would have predicted. Tactics such as leadership decapitation grabbed headlines and undoubtedly threw Iran’s military and governance system into chaos in the short term, but a regime whose ideological foundation is heavily reliant on a narrative of resistance in the face of overwhelming odds soon found its equilibrium. Decentralising authority for its missile, rocket and drone strikes after lessons learnt from earlier attacks also allowed Iran to conduct offensive operations while its political and military leadership was being reconstituted.

Washington also lost the information war. It is a hard ask for a liberal democracy to appear less caring than a revolutionary theocratic regime about individual rights and the unintended consequences of war, yet the White House did exactly that. The killing of more than 150 children and teachers at a school in Minab on the US’s first day of bombing dealt a fatal blow to Washington’s claims of a precision air campaign. Trump’s original denial and the administration’s continued refusal to accept responsibility in the face of regular media questioning have further eroded US credi