Human Error Caused a $4.1 Million Mishap at NASA’s Deep Space Network

NASA officials wrapped up an investigation into an incident that caused significant damage to one of its largest Deep Space Network (DSN) antennas, finding that operators were stretched beyond their usual roles to keep the facility operating.

The Mishap Investigation Board issued its final report on the incident, blaming software weaknesses, human error, and an undocumented failure for the mishap. The 230-foot-wide radio antenna remains offline while NASA gets to work on its repairs, which the agency estimates will cost somewhere between $4.1 and $4.6 million.

“We are committed to learning everything we can from this incident, and we’ve already begun putting those lessons into practice,” Kevin Coggins, deputy associate administrator for NASA’s SCaN (Space Communications and Navigation) Program, said in a statement.

On September 16, 2025, the DSS-14 antenna went dark after over-rotating and subsequently straining the cabling and piping at its center. The hoses from the antenna’s fire suppression system were also damaged, resulting in flooding and water damage.

DSS-14, located at the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex near Barstow, California, is crucial for sending commands and receiving data from ongoing missions in deep space.

At the time, NASA didn’t share much information on the cause of the mishap, but the recent report reveals new details on the incident. The radio frequency antenna was tracking the Juno mission, an orbiting probe that’s been studying Jupiter for the past decade, when it over-rotated and placed excessive stress on cabling and associated structural supports.

Investigators later found that an electrical issue from the previous day caused the control system to misreport the antenna’s rotation state. The issue went unnoticed, and it triggered multiple limit stops while the antenna was tracking Juno. Operators at the site were trying to identify what was causing the limit stops and performed several troubleshooting steps that inadvertently bypassed software and hardware safeguards. That is what ultimately led to the antenna over-rotating.

Once operators noticed the flooding in the facility, they attempted to stow the antenna as a safety precaution. The system had already passed the rotation limits, so their attempt drove the antenna further into overrotation and caused additional damage.

The investigation also found the antenna’s hydraulic limit system, its final mechanical safeguard, was inoperable on that day after being damaged in a prior incident that was undocumented. The hydraulic limit system had not been adequate