Crypto assets and exchange control: A critical analysis of a defining high court judgment

The high court judgment reset the legal definition of crypto when it held that cryptocurrency is both ‘money’ and ‘capital’. South Africa now has conflicting high court authorities on whether exchange controls apply to crypto assets, a situation requiring appellate resolution.

Alude Xuba is an admitted attorney of the High Court of South Africa and the founder and managing attorney of a boutique business law and IP law firm. He has a keen interest in corporate and commercial law, intellectual property law, artificial intelligence, and litigation.

On 1 June 2026, the Gauteng High Court (Wilson J) held in Mangundhla and Another v South African Reserve Bank and Others (No. 2022-029979) that Bitcoin “constitutes both money and capital” under the “Exchange Control Regulations of 1961, (Regulations)” and that transferring crypto assets to foreign exchange wallets amounts to the unlawful export of capital. The court dismissed the review application against forfeiture orders totalling about R6-million, with costs on scale C. The contrary decision in Standard Bank v SARB 2025 (5) SA 289 (GP) was dismissed as “clearly wrong”.

The court defined “capital” as any financial asset capable of holding value or serving as a medium of exchange (para. 13). Applying this test, Bitcoin qualified because it can be exchanged for fiat currency, used directly to purchase goods and services, and serves as both a medium of exchange and a store of value. The court held that export occurs when the thing exported leaves the country and that crediting Bitcoin to wallets on foreign exchanges suffices (para 26). Regarding forfeiture, the court held that Bitcoin is money because the regulations defined “money” to include any bill of exchange or other negotiable instruments, and Bitcoin exhibits qualities sufficient to bring it within this definition.

The court’s definition of “capital” finds no support in the regulations, the Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933, or any binding authority. It offers no limiting principle: on this formulation, any asset holding value and exchangeable, including art, vehicles, or any tradable commodity, would constitute capital. The court does not explain why Oilwell (Pty) Ltd v Protec International Ltd 2011 (4) SA 394 (SCA) (at paras 9-11) excluded tangible property if the test is merely the capacity to hold value and serve as a medium of exchange. The distinction between financial and tangible assets collapses entirely. Moreover, the phrase “medium of exchange” is indeterminate; many assets function as media of exchange in specific contexts without bei